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COMMENTS
Mobile Homes in North Carolina: Residence or Vehicle?
Mobile homes have been used for permanent residences for over
forty years, but only in the last twenty years have they become an
important substitute for conventional single-family detached dwellings.
The modern mobile home originated in the 1920's and was ten to twelve
feet in length; these first mobile homes were used for recreational pur-
poses and can be compared to the present camp trailer) By the 1930's
mobile homes had increased in length to about twenty-two to twenty-
eight feet, and they were used as an inexpensive form of housing during
the depression.' However, the mobile homes of the depression years,
although a needed supplement to the housing market, were not compa-
rable to the conventional single-family housing of that time, since the
mobile homes had no self-contained plumbing or sanitary facilities3 (if,
in truth, most conventional dwellings of the 1930's had indoor plumb-
ing). Since World War II, the mobile home has increasingly shed its
mobility, the feature which prompted its original invention, and has
begun to approach in design and structure prefabricated and modular
housing.4 The unruly "trailer camps" of the past have become parks
subject to extensive regulation.'
The federal government has recognized not only the popularity of
the mobile home as a residence but also its potential as a partial solution
to the nation's acute housing shortage. Mobile home dwellers may ob-
tain FHA-insured loans to finance the purchase of mobile homes in-
tended for occupancy by the buyers as their principal residence.' The
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also provides




'See Instant Housing, 25 J. HOUSING 467 (1968).
sMost of the states have enacted statutes providing for the licensing of mobile home parks.
Although North Carolina has enacted no such statute, most municipalities in North Carolina have
adopted ordinances to ensure that minimum standards are maintained in mobile home parks. See
Starr, Guidelines for Mobile Home Park Development, 39 APPRAISAL J. 41 (1971). Furthermore,
in order to obtain FHA assistance to finance construction or rehabilitation of mobile home parks
or to obtain FHA financing of a mobile home to be placed in a mobile home park, the park must
comply with comprehensive standards which HUD deems necessary. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 207.33(h),
201.525(b) (1971).
612 U.S.C. § 1703 (a) (1970).
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an FHA program to finance the construction and rehabilitation of mo-
bile home parks. 7 HUD recognizes that the mobile home is principally
a movable dwelling and not an immobilized vehicle.
8
Although many persons live in mobile homes by choice, others live
in mobile homes by necessity. It is almost impossible to construct a
brick and mortar house for 15,000 dollars because of skyrocketing land,
materials, and labor costs.' In contrast, in 1969 the mobile home indus-
try sold sixty-seven percent of all single-family housing under 25,000
dollars (412,690 mobile homes), seventy-five percent of all the single-
family dwellings under 20,000 dollars, and ninety-four percent of all
those under 15,000 dollars.'0 Purchasing a home for 15,000 dollars in
most cases will be less expensive in the long run than renting an apart-
ment or other conventional dwelling.
Generally, mobile home dwellers no longer can be classified as
transients, although many persons reside in mobile homes because they
are uncertain as to the length of time they will remain in a particular
community." A "transient" individual probably would not live in a
modern mobile home since the structure is not as susceptible to ready
movement as were the camp trailers of the 1930's.12 Most of those who
now live in mobile homes are permanent residents of the community
who, by choice or necessity, have selected that particular structure as
their dwelling.' 3
'12 U.S.C. § 1713(a)(l)(B) (1970).
RHUD regulations define a mobile home as "a movable dwelling unit designed and constructed
for permanent occupancy by a single family which dwelling unit contains permanent eating, cook-
ing, sleeping, and sanitary facilities." 24 C.F.R. § 201.501() (1971).
'Starr, Guidelines for Mobile Home Park Development, 39 APPRAISAL J. 41, 42 (1971).
'Old.
"These include defense and construction workers who are concentrated in areas in which the
increase in population has been rapid and is not likely to be permanent, military personnel, farm
workers, and young married couples who are uncertain of their stay in a particular community.
HODES & ROBERSON 5.
"The owner of a modern mobile home will usually have to detach the structure from plumbing,
sewage, and electrical outlets if he wishes to move it to a new site. The owner may then be required
to obtain a special permit from the state highway commission to tow the mobile home on the public
highways. See, e.g. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-119 (1965). The local governing body of the place of
destination probably will require a permit to park the mobile home and will subject the structure
to other regulations.
"Classes of permanent residents who prefer mobile homes include young married couples
who prefer ownership to renting but are not financially able to furnish and equip a conventional
home, those who prefer the atmosphere of a mobile home park, retired persons who prefer a home
of their own which combines a maximum of comfort and convenience with a minimum of effort
and expense to maintain, and those permanent residents who are attracted to the low original cost
and minimum maintenance of the mobile home and the simplicity and economy of housekeeping
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North Carolina has not as yet enacted a comprehensive statute
regulating the mobile home as a dwelling or listing the standards to be
maintained in mobile home parks. 4 However, the 1969 General Assem-
bly recognized that the primary use of a mobile home is as a substitute
for conventional single-family dwellings and adopted the Uniform Stan-
dards Code for Mobile Homes Act for the purpose of assuring the sound
construction of mobile homes in North Carolina. 5 In addition, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has taken the attitude that the mobile
home has developed from a camp-type vehicle into an accepted mode
of living: "Trailer living is a perfectly respectable, healthy and useful
kind of housing, adopted by choice by several million people in this
country today."'" (The impact of the statement is clear, and the attitude
is commendable, though some mobile home dwellers and manufacturers
might be offended by the use of the term "trailer.")
Nevertheless, a majority of North Carolina municipalities evidence
a myopic conception of the modern mobile home and regulate the loca-
tion of mobile homes in much the same manner as the trailer camps of
the 1930's might have been proscribed.
I. TYPES OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES REGULATING THE USE OF MO-
BILE HOMES AS RESIDENCES
The authority of North Carolina municipalities to regulate mobile
homes as residences is derived either from the power conferred by the
state to municipalities to zone 7 or from the power conferred to munici-
palities to abate nuisances.' 8 A city or town in this state has no inherent
police power and can exercise only such powers as are expressly granted
to it by the General Assembly or as are necessarily implied from those
conferred. 9 Pursuant to the authority given to the municipalities of
it offers. HODES & ROBERSON 5-6.
"For examples of comprehensive state statutes regulating mobile homes and mobile home
parks, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 18000-18475 (West 1964); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 111 /2,
§§ 158-85 (1966); ANN. IND. STAT. §§ 35-2841 to -2881 (1969); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 5.278(31)-
(127) (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 327.14-.29 (1966); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-3201 to -3220
(1966).
15N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-144 to -151.1 (Supp. 1971). Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 19960-19997 (West Supp. 1972).
"Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 443, 177 S.E.2d 879, 882 (1970), quoting Vickers
v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
"7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-381 (1972).
"Isd. § 160A-193.
"Id. § 160-1. See also State v. Furio, 267 N.C. 141, 148 S.E.2d 275 (1966); State v. Byrd,
259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55 (1963).
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North Carolina under the statutory grants, they have promulgated ordi-
nances that prescribe in which areas and under what circumstances one
may place a mobile home in the municipality or within a prescribed area
beyond its limits.2"
A. Ordinances That Effectively Proscribe Mobile Home Parks and
Individual Mobile Homes.
Few municipalities have absolutely prohibited the use of mobile
homes as residences. However, at least one, the Town of Conover, has
attempted to prohibit mobile homes under its authority to abate nuis-
ances. 21 The City of Chapel Hill, until 1971, had no provision for the
establishment of mobile homes on individual lots and required special
use permits for construction of mobile home parks. 2 North Carolina
courts have consistently held that the issuance of a special use permit is
not a legal right but rather a concession to be made in exceptional cases
in the discretion of the zoning board of adjustment. The zoning board's
decision is subject to court review.2 The zoning ordinance of the Town
of Canton, for example, makes no express provision permitting mobile
homes within the town's zoning territory. Rather, Canton's ordinance
provides for the creation of mobile home parks districts by amendment
to the zoning map whenever an applicant satisfies the board of aldermen
that his land is suitable for such a purpose.24 The City of Goldsboro does
permit mobile home parks as a matter of right but only to a limited
extent; mobile home parks are permitted only beyond the city limits
(and, of course, within the one-mile farther reach of the city's zoning
jurisdiction). Those parks within the city limits which existed at the time
the ordinance was adopted may increase their area once by a maximum
of two acres.1
5
B. Ordinances That Permit Mobile Homes Only Within Approved
Mobile Home Parks.
The majority of zoned municipalities in North Carolina permit
"'The North Carolina General Assembly has conferred upon the municipalities an extraterrito-
rial zoning power beyond the limits of the municipality. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 (1972).
2
CONOVER, N.C., CODE § 12-22 (1970).
"CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE § 4-D-14 (1972). Chapel Hill has now provided for a zoning
district permitting individual mobile homes. Id. § 3-A-6.
23See, e.g., Joyner v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 44, 147 S.E.2d 602 (1966); Craver
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 267 N.C. 40, 147 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
24CANTON, N.C. CODE § 19-9(c) (1971).
2GOLDSBORO, N.C., CODE § 26-88 (1970).
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mobile homes within the zoning territory but confine them to approved
mobile home parks either by express language or by failing to include
provisions permitting the location of mobile homes outside parks. 6 The
exceptions generally granted for location outside parks are for the use
of a mobile home for non-residential purposes. One or more of the
following exceptions are usually permitted:z7
(1) Mobile homes used as temporary offices for construction
personnel.
(2) Mobile homes used to supplement facilities of a church,
school, or college.
(3) Unoccupied mobile homes stored on the property on which
the owner's dwelling house is located. (This exception is de-
signed primarily to accommodate camp trailers.)
(4) Mobile homes parked on a dealer's property and intended
for sale.
(5) Mobile homes used by watchmen.
The mobile home parks themselves are subject to regulations gov-
erning lot size; spacing between mobile homes; water, sewer, and gar-
bage facilities; width of streets in the park; park size; access to public
highways; drainage and condition of the land; required permits; inspec-
tions of the parks; automobile parking; maintenance of service build-
ings; and other regulations relating to the health and safety of the park
residents.2 These regulations, if not so onerous as to prohibit mobile
homes altogether, are comparable to municipal regulations of subdivi-
sions.
29
25E.g.. ASHEBORO, N.C., CODE § 10-11 (1971); CANTON, N.C., CODE § 19-9(a) (1971);
CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 23-31 (1970); DURHAM, N.C., CODE § 24-12V (1971); FAYETTEVILLE,
N.C., CODE § 30-7(1)(b) (1971); FOREST CITY, N.C., CODE § 23-23 (1971) (no provision for
erection of individual mobile homes); GASTONIA, N.C., CODE §§ 23A-9, 25-15 (a)(15) (1971)
(same); GOLDSBORO, N.C., CODE § 26-90(a) (1970); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 21-10 (1971);
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE § 24-12(h)(1) (1971); SALISBURY, N.C., CODE app., tit. 11, § 10.07 (1970):
WILSON, N.C. CODE § 17-3(c) (1971).
2'See, e.g., DURHAM, N.C., CODE § 24-12V (1971); FAYETTEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 30-7
(1971); GOLDSBORO, N.C., CODE § 26-90 (1970); GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 21-10 (1971);
HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE §§ 22-23.9(l)-(4) (1971); SALISBURY, N.C., CODE app., tit. II, § 10.07
(1970); WILSON, N.C., CODE § 17-3(c) (1971).
2'For example, Jacksonville regulates the division of a tract into mobile home lots in the same
manner as a conventional subdivision. JACKSONVILLE, N.C., CODE § 25-10-1 (1971).
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C. Ordinances That Permit Mobile Homes Either in Mobile Home
Parks or on Individual Lots Outside of Parks.
A few municipalities in North Carolina have not confined mobile
homes to approved mobile home parks but have regarded the mobile
home that has been permanently affixed to the real estate as essentially
equivalent to a single-family dwelling. Other municipalities have not
accorded the mobile home the same status as a single-family dwelling
but have recognized that the mobile home may be a necessary substitute
for conventional housing in times of emergency or temporary housing
shortages.
Morganton and Jacksonville are examples of municipalities that
view the mobile home as a type of single-family dwelling. Morganton
permits mobile homes on individual lots in a residential district provided
the lot is the real property of the owner-occupant. In addition, the
mobile home must have been inspected and must comply with all applic-
able ordinances. 0 Jacksonville provides that if mobile homes spaces are
sold as individual lots in a tract, the park plan must be treated as a
subdivision and all requirements of the city's subdivision and zoning
ordinance pertaining to lot size, access to a public street, and other
regulations must be satisfied .
3
Other municipalities permit residence in mobile homes outside
mobile home parks under more narrow circumstances. Albermarle, for
example, permits one mobile home in a rear yard as temporary, acces-
sory use if the board of commissioners finds that a personal hardship
justifies a special exception to the ordinance restricting mobile homes
to parks. 32 Asheboro permits the use of a mobile home as a residence
for no longer than thirty days provided the mobile home is located on
premises upon which a conventional dwelling house is already lo-
cated.33 Winston-Salem allows individual mobile homes in a residen-
tial district only if the owner obtains a special use permit.
34
The City of High Point has a unique ordinance that recognizes the
potential of the mobile home as an immediate solution to a paucity of
adequate urgan housing. Subject to the recommendation of the planning
and zoning commission and approval by the city council, mobile homes
used for temporary emergency housing are permitted in areas of the city
"MORGANTON, N.C., CODE app. A, § 8K (1970).
31JACKSONVILLE, N.C., CODE § 25-10-1 (1971).
3 ALBERMARLE, N.C., CODE § 19-105 (1971).
3ASHEBORO, N.C., CODE § 10-12 (1971).
3'4WINSTON-SALENt, N.C., CODE § 29-7(F) (1971).
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as to which there is evidence of a critical lack of adequate, safe, and
sanitary housing.35
D. Ordinances That Exclude Mobile Homes or Mobile Home Parks
from Residential Districts.
Although most North Carolina municipalities confine mobile
homes to mobile home parks, the parks themselves generally are permit-
ted in residential areas. At one time it was common practice for munici-
palities throughout the nation to consider the operation of a mobile
home park a commercial venture which should be confined to a com-
mercial or other non-residential district .3 This attitude seems spurious
and may merely have been a subterfuge to separate mobile homes from
conventional housing.37 Some North Carolina municipalities retain this
view. For example, the Town of Forest City permits mobile home parks
only in the highway business or industrial districts. 3 The ordinance
does not permit individual mobile homes to be located outside approved
mobile home parks.39 Charlotte takes a less restrictive but similar view;
its zoning ordinance permits mobile home parks in a multi-family resi-
dential district but requires the park to adjoin a business or industrial
district so that the park will constitute a transitional use between com-
mercial or industrial development and a permanent residential develop-
ment.40
Several municipalities in North Carolina restrict mobile home
parks to agricultural or agricultural-residential districts.4
Special "mobile home" districts for the location of mobile homes
and mobile home parks have been created in some municipalities. 4
Confining mobile homes to these special districts prevents mobile home
dwellers from residing in residential districts comprised of conventional
dwellings but at least allows their neighborhood to be residential in
character.
3HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 22-23.9(5) (1971).
31See generally HODES & ROBERSON 156; Starr, Guidelines for Mobile Home Park Develop-
ment, 39 APPRAISAL J. 41 (1971).
3See generally Bartke & Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
491, 510 (1970).
"FOREST CITY, N.C., CODE § 23-28, -37 (1971).
391d.
"0CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 23-31 (1970) (see the table of permitted uses).
"See, e.g.. CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE § 4-D-14 (1972); LUMBERTON, N.C., CODE § 29-44(h)
(1969).
2See, e.g., HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 22-9.1 (1971).
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II. CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF ORDINANCES REGULATING
THE LOCATION OF MOBILE HOMES-
A. "A Trailer is a Trailer is a Trailer."
The courts could circumvent the restrictive ordinances of North
Carolina municipalities by holding that a mobile home that has been
permanently attached to the real estate is no longer a "mobile home"
or "trailer" as defined in the ordinance but rather is to be considered a
single-family dwelling outside the ambit of the proscription. Admit-
tedly, at first glance the proposition seems a bit abstruse, and most
courts considering the theory have rejected it and have dogmatically
reiterated the position that a structure constructed as a trailer remains
a trailer even though it is affixed in a more or less permanent fashion
to the real estate and is equipped with electrical, plumbing, and sanitary
facilities similar to those of a conventional house.13 Nevertheless, it is
submitted that those decisions are supported by questionable logic. A
prefabricated 'houses or a modular dwelling does not remain a vehicle
simply because it was transported to a dwelling site by a vehicle and may
at some time be uprooted and again transported. The modern mobile
home is comparable to these prefabricated or modular homes. The
language of one representative holding indicates that the decisions re-
jecting the idea that a mobile home may be transformed into a dwelling
house are based not on a rational distinction between mobile homes and
conventional homes but upon the courts' concepts of aesthetics in archi-
tectural style of dwelling houses:
In ordinary parlance the unit shown in the exhibits will be spoken of
as a trailer or a mobile home, even if it has not been sold with wheels
or its wheels have been taken away, and even if it has been affixed to
the land. It looks like a trailer, has the qualities of a trailer superstruc-
ture, and has been built as a trailer."
13E.g., Hebb v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 150 Conn. 539, 192 A.2d 206 (1963); Bixler v. Pierson,
188 So.) (2d 681 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966)); Adams v. Cowart, 224 Ga. 210, 160 S.E.2d 805 (1968);
City of New Orleans v. Louviere, 52 So. 2d 751 (La. Ct. App. 1951); Wright v. Michaud 160 Me.
164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962);
Town of Brewster v. Sherman, 343 Mass. 598, 180 N.E.2d 338 (1962); Town of Marblehead v.
Gilbert, 334 Mass. 602, 137 N.E.2d 921 (1956); Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181
A.2d 129 (1962); People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Washington County Ct.
1965); Casella v. Stumpf, 29 Misc. 2d 460, 217 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1961); City of Astoria v.
Nothwang, 221 Ore. 452, 351 P.2d 688 (1960).
"Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass. 591, 596, 180 N.E.2d 333, 337 (1962) (emphasis
added).
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Another court held that since the petitioner repeatedly used the word
"trailer" in his application for a building permit, the structure must
indeed be a trailer and must always remain so. Accordingly, the court
held that the "mobile home" could not be placed in a residential dis-
trict. 5
A minority of jurisdictions have held that a mobile home that has
been permanently attached to the land has lost its mobility and should
be considered a single-family dwelling." For example, the Supreme
Court of Washington held that
[w]hatever features of mobility the home had originally, the mobility
was of the home itself. It was not a vehicle, and did not become a
proscribed immobilized vehicle when its mobile characteristics were
removed and it was placed upon a foundation. It was prefabricated
one-family dwelling unit which was not prohibited upon the land in
question.4"
The reasoning of the Washington case and other cases in accord could
easily be applied to municipal ordinances in North Carolina that em-
phasize the character of a mobile home as a vehicle.48 However, many
North Carolina municipalities have drafted provisions defining mobile
homes very broadly, and these definitions would probably be construed
to cover mobile homes regardless of their permanent attachment to real
estate or the nature of their design. The City of Greensboro has couched
its definition of a mobile home so as to enbcompass every style of
mobile home, including double-wide mobile homes (which are probably
more similar to modular housing than to mobile homes):
Mobile home shall mean a movable or portable dwelling over 32 feet
in length and over 8 feet wide, constructed to be towed on its own
chassis and designed without a permanent foundation for year-round
occupancy, which includes one or more components that can be re-
tracted for towing purposes and subsequently expanded for additional
capacity, or of two or more units separately towable but designed to
be joined into one integral unit, as well as a portable dwelling com-
Casella v. Stumpf, 29 Misc. 2d 460, 217 N.Y.S.2d 709 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
4 E.g., Douglass Twp. v. Badman, 206 Pa. Super. 390, 213 A.2d 88 (1965); Commonwealth
v. Flannery, I Pa. D. & C. 2d 680 (Cumberland County Ct. 1954); Lescaut v. Zoning Bd., 91 R.I.
277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960); City of Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62 (1955); In
re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d I I (1958); State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 (1969).
"State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 204, 207, 449 P.2d 806, 808-09 (1969).
"See, e.g.. CANTON, N.C., CODE § 19-2 (37) (1971); GASTONIA, N.C., CODE § 25-2(36)




posed of a single unit. Such vehicle shall contain as an integral part of
its construction kitchen facilities and a completely equipped bathroom
containing a flush toilet, lavatory, and bathtub or shower. 9
It seems anomolous that the Greensboro ordinance expressly refers to
the structure as a "vehicle" after emphasizing that it is basically a fully
equipped and possibly a large-size home. Admittedly a mobile home is
by one definition a vehicle, but this is not its essential purpose. 0
The ordinances of North Carolina municipalities often emphasize
that a mobile home will remain a mobile home whether or not set on
jacks, skirtings or masonry blocks, or other temporary or permanent
facilities." Therefore, the only real distinction between the mobile home
as broadly defined by ordinance and a prefabricated or modular house
may be the fact that the mobile home is designed to be towed on its own
chassis. The City of Fayetteville has abrogated even this gossamer
distinction by defining a mobile home as a dwelling "[d]esigned to be
transported after fabrication on its own wheels, or on a flatboard or on
other trailers or detachable wheels."
53
It is doubtful whether a mobile home could ever be considered to
be a single-family dwelling under these broad definitions; but the defini-
tions themselves draw such tenuous distinctions between mobile homes
and other homes that North Carolina courts might determine that the
ordinances regulating the location of mobile homes are arbitrary and
unreasonable and therefore an unconstitutional exercise of police power.
B. The Constitutional Test: "Arbitrary and Unreasonable."
Zoning and other regulatory legislation is presumed to be constitu-
" GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 21-1(a) (1971). Compare with this the ordinance of Rocky
Mount, which states that a mobile home as defined will be "considered a Mobile Home regardless
of actual size and shape of the unit." ROCKY MOUNT, N.C., CODE app. B, § III (1970).
-r5 o illustrate this point by way of a loose analogy, a telephone pole or large log is often
transported by attaching wheels and an axle to one end and towing it along public highways.
However, one does not normally think of it as a type of vehicle but merely as a pole with wheels
attached for easier transport to the site at which it is to be used for a specific purpose.
31See, e.g., CHARLOTTE, N.C., CODE § 23-2(16a) (1970); HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE § 22-
9.1(A)(l)(1971); ROCKY MOUNT, N.C., CODE app. B, § I (1970). Compare the statutory provi-
sion of Illinois, which states that a mobile home "resting in whole on a permanent foundation,
with wheels, tongue and hitch permanently removed shall not be construed as a . 'Mobile
Home.'" ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111h, § 159 (1966).
5"See, e.g., CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE § 13 (1972); SALISBURY, N.C., CODE app. tit. II,
§ 4.02(15) (1970).
51FAYETrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 30-2(I)(b) (1971).
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tional54 and will be upheld if not arbitrary and unreasonable and if
designed to promote some legitimate state interest.5 5 The courts are not
anxious to substitute their judgment for that of the legislative body
charged with the duty and responsibility of determining social and eco-
nomic policy. 6
When a municipality totally prohibits the residential use of mobile
homes, the weight of authority holds that the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional as an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Total exclusion of mobile homes bears no relationship to the health,
morals, safety, or general welfare of the community." The North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, in Town of Conover v. Jolly,58 held that Conover,
which contained within its limits residential areas, neighborhood trading
areas, manufacturing areas, and minor farming areas, could not totally
prohibit the use of a mobile home as a permanent residence if the home
presented no threat to the health or safety of its occupants or of any
other person. The court found that the case did not involve any question
as to the authority of a city or town, by a properly enacted zoning
ordinance, to divide its territory into zones and to restrict the use of
mobile homes to one or more such zones. 9 The case also did not concern
the validity of an ordinance requiring mobile homes to conform to
specifications as to construction, size of lot, equipment, connection with
water or sewer systems, or other sanitary or safety measures.," The
ordinance was construed as having been adopted pursuant to the munici-
pality's authority to abate nuisances rather than its power to zone.'
Consequently, the court was able to avoid the constitutional issue by
holding that since a mobile home is not a nuisance per se, the town
exceeded its authority under the statutory grant of the power to abate
nuisances.6" The court emphasized that it did not reach the serious
51See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 464 (1957); United States v. Carolene Prod. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938); City of Gastonia v. Parrish, 271 N.C. 527, 157 S.E.2d 154 (1967).
51See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961). See also Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
-See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,486 (1970); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255
N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
57See, e.g., Borough of Mountville v. Miller, 7 Pa. D. & C.2d 577 (1956); In re Falls Twp,
Trailer Ord., 84 Pa. D. & C. 199 (1952). See ANNOT., 96 A.L.R.2d 232, 237-39 (1964).
-277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970).
"Id. at 442, 177 S.E.2d at 881.
wId.
"Id.
"2Id. at 444, 177 S.E.2d at 882.
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question of whether such an ordinance, if authorized by statute, would
violate article one, section seventeen of the North Carolina Constitu-
tion, which provides that no person may be deprived of his liberty or
property without due process of law.
63
If the ordinance of Conover had been adopted as a zoning ordi-
nance, the court probably would have followed the weight of authority
and held the ordinance unconstitutional. In fact, the lower court and the
defendant mobile home owner were of the opinion that although the
ordinance in question was not specifically designated a zoning ordi-
nance, it was in the nature of one and that under the applicable law of
zoning the ordinance was unconstitutional.64 Even the Town of Conover
conceded that where a zoning ordinance totally prohibits the use of
mobile homes it exceeds the governing body's police power and is
constitutional.
6 5
When ordinances do not totally prohibit mobile homes but merely
confine their use to approved parks, the ordinances are generally held
to be valid and enforcible and not an arbitrary and unreasonable exer-
cise of the police power.66 However, as mobile home manufacturers
continue to lessen the distinction between the mobile home and prefabri-
cated and modular housing, and as mass-produced housing begins to
supplant traditional housing, the confinement of mobile homes to mo-
bile home parks may begin to be construed as arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. Many of the elaborate definitions discussed earlier in this comment
and the restrictions imposed upon mobile homes as defined in the ordi-
nances are susceptible to being construed as arbitrary and unreasonable.
The zoning ordinance of Chapel Hill provides a good example of a
meaningless distinction between mobile homes and prefabricated hous-
ing. A comparison of the definitions of both types of dwellings reveals
that the only distinction is that a mobile home is designed to roll on its
own chassis while a prefabricated house must be placed on a flatbed
6Id.
"Record at 17-19; Brief for Appellee at 3.
'5Brief for Appellant at 3. Conover argued, however, that because of the exceptions to the
provision permitting the use of mobile homes as construction offices and other non-residential
purposes, the ordinance was not a total prohibition. Id.
"See, e.g., Davis v. Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943); Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d
702 (Fla.) (en banc), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170
N.E.2d 364 (1960); Wyoming v. Hermeyer, 321 Mich. 611, 33 N.W.2d 93 (1948); Mobile Home
Owners Protective Ass'n v. Town of Chatham, 33 App. Div. 2d 78, 305 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1969);
People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Washington County Ct. 1965).
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trailer to be moved. 7 If the manufacturer simply construed the "mobile
home" without axles or wheels and delivered it on a flatbed trailer, the
dwelling could fall within the definition of a prefabricated house. When
attached to the real estate, the mobile home is only slightly more mobile
than a prefabricated house since the wheels and axles are often removed
anyway. 8 However, the City of Chapel Hill restricts mobile homes to
mobile home parks or to one residential district, while prefabricated
housing is accorded the same status as a comparable conventional hous-
ing.6
9
Although the court in Town of Conover v. Jolly70 did not decide
whether a mobile home could always be confined to a mobile home
park, it did state that a mobile home that is well constructed and
equipped and connected with public utility systems cannot be deemed
detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience, and
welfare of the people in the community without regard to the nature and
use of the surrounding property.71 The language suggests that a mobile
home may attain the status of a single-family dwelling and cannot be
excluded from the appropriate district to be used for comparable dwell-
ings.
Municipal ordinances that confine mobile home parks to districts
that are not essentially residential in character have also generally been
held valid.72 Mobile home parks do present problems of safety, sanita-
tion, and lack of conformity with other residential uses, but the same
problems exist with respect to other multi-family dwellings that are
usually permitted in residential districts. It is also true that at least as
far as the operator is concerned the mobile home park is a commercial
enterprise, and, relying upon this excuse, many municipalities have con-
fined mobile home parks to commercial or other non-residential dis-
tricts.73 This has occurred despite of the fact that the operation of
"See CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE § 13 (1972). See also GREENSBORO, N.C., CODE § 21-1
(1971).
"The municipal ordinance could reasonably require the mobile home to be connected to a
permanent foundation and require a permanent enclosure around the base of the mobile home.
E.g., MORGANTON, N.C., CODE app. A, § 8(k) (1970).
"3CHAPEL HILL, N.C., Code § 3 (1972).
70277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879 (1970).
71ld. at 443, 177 S.E.2d at 881.
1See, e.g., Town of Greenland v. Hussey, - N.H. -, 266 A.2d 122(1970); Napierkowski
v. Gloucester Twp. 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38,
121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. 1953).




mobile home parks is no more commercial than is the operation of
apartment buildings. Arguably, mobile home parks should be consid-
ered in the nature of "horizontal apartment buildings" and should be
permitted in multi-family residential districts. To those who dwell in
mobile home parks-or apartments-their way of life is not a commer-
cial venture but rather is simply one method of satisfying the require-
ment of shelter. The Town of Jacksonville has recognized that "[miobile
home parks are residential uses and should be located in appropriate
residential districts. 7
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in City of Raleigh v.
Morand,75 held that a Raleigh ordinance that prohibited the construc-
tion and maintenance of a mobile home park within a residential zone
was a valid exercise of the police power and could be enforced by
injunctive relief. The mobile home park in Morand was operated for
profit.7 Although the Morand decision has been reaffirmed in subse-
quent decisions, 77 it was handed down in 1957 and deserves reconsidera-
tion. The mobile home park of today, because it is usually subjected to
stringent regulations of maintenance, facilities, and inspection, has little
in common with the camps for transients which were widespread in the
past. At present over four million people reside in mobile homes.78 That
many people should not be prohibited from living in residential areas
of the community.
Municipalities have offered many reasons why ordinances regulat-
ing the location of mobile homes should not be held arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. Three of the justifications most often raised deserve special
mention. First, some municipalities have argued that the problem of
taxing mobile homes has resulted in mobile home dwellers not paying
for their share of neighborhood school expenses and community serv-
ices. 7 However, since North Carolina levies a tax upon both real and
personal property, the mobile home will be subject to taxation in any
event. Furthermore, the mobile home is not likely to evade the county
tax supervisor because of its mobility; mobile home park operators in
North Carolina must report to the tax supervisor of the county the name
74JACKSONVILLE, N.C., CODE § 25-10.1 (1971).
75247 N.C. 363, 100 S.E.2d 870 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 343 (1958).
71Id. at 365, 100 S.E.2d at 871.
7See, e.g., Town of Garner v. Weston, 263 N.C. 487, 139 S.E.2d 642 (1964).
"See HODES & ROBERSON 161.
"Id. at 10.
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of the owner of and the description of each mobile home in the park,'"
and any mobile home on an individual lot within the municipality will
be conspicuous to county officials. Secondly, some municipalities have
argued that because mobile homes are usually manufactured outside the
municipality that seeks to ensure their safe construction under the appl-
icable building codes, there is no opportunity for inspection during con-
struction for structural strength, adequacy of wiring, sufficiency of
plumbing, and heating facilities.8 However, this argument has lost
much of its vitality since the General Assembly in 1969 adopted the
Uniform Standards Code for Mobile Homes Act to ensure safe con-
struction of mobile homes sold in this state." At least one purpose of
the act was to obviate the necessity of local concern over the quality of
construction of mobile homes. 3 A third justification for severely re-
stricting the location of mobile homes is the preservation of aesthetic
qualities, and thus property values, of a particular neighborhood. This
justification traditionally has been considered one of the legitimate pur-
poses of zoning. The United States Supreme Court, in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Company,84 stated in dicta that the governing body
has a legitimate interest in preserving a particular character of a neigh-
borhood (in that case, a "high-class" neighborhood), and dwellings not
of the same caliber or function as the other dwellings of the neighbor-
hood may destroy the character of the neighborhood and "come very
near to being nuisances." However, the large number of people choos-
ing to reside in mobile homes and the scarcity of adequate conventional
housing and available land in municipalities may now lead to the conclu-
sion that aesthetics alone is not sufficient justification to prohibit mobile
homes in a particular district. 8 Changed conditions prompted the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in a case dealing with the location of apart-
ments in a low-density district to re-evaluate the impact of the Euclid
decision:
That landmark case which first recognized municipal planning and
regulation of land use as a valid exercise of the police power of the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-311 (Supp. 1971).
"See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 4, Town of Conover v. Jolly, 277 N.C. 439, 177 S.E.2d 879
(1970).
82N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-144 to -151.1 (Supp. 1971).
"See Foreward to N.C. DEP'T OF INSURANCE, REGULATIONS FOR MOBILE HomEs (1970).
-272 U.S. 365 (1926).
m1d. at 394-95.
"See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Flannery, I Pa. D. & C.2d 680 (1954).
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states was decided in 1926. Since that time more and more people have
turned to apartments as permanent homes-many by choice. Few, if
any, cities today enjoy the luxury of having enough land available to
accommodate substantially all their citizens in detached houses ....
We are therefore not persuaded that conditions today are the same as
those that prompted the dicta in the Euclid case almost half a century
ago.S7
This reasoning would seem applicable to mobile homes or mobile home
parks as well. This is not to say that mobile homes or mobile home
parks should be permitted in zoning districts accommodating dwellings
far more expensive than mobile homes."8 Nevertheless, with only a mod-
icum of imagination a municipality can devise a comprehensive zoning
planto determine how many classes of residential districts it requires
and what types of dwellings should be assigned to each district.
C. The Constitutional Test of "Rigid Scrutiny."
Under the traditional tests of due process and equal protection, the
mobile home owner or park operator has the difficult burden of showing
that the restrictive ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable and is de-
signed to promote no legitimate purpose before it can be held unconsti-
tutional. If, however, the aggrieved party can convince the court that
the ordinance is based upon a classification of race, national origin, or
lineage89 or infringes upon a fundamental right," the court will apply a
standard of rigid scrutiny to test the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Municipal ordinances severely restricting the permissible locations
of mobile homes have the effect of discriminating between classes of
residents on the basis of wealth. An ordinance may exclude persons
from living in residential districts because they can not afford to buy or
rent a dwelling in that district. However, those same persons may be
able to buy a mobile home and purchase or rent a lot." Even if the
"Allred v. City of Raleigh, 7 N.C. App. 602, 611, 173 S.E.2d 533, 538 (1970), rev'd on other
grounds, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
"However, permitting residence in a district according to one's ability to pay has come under
increased attack. See, e.g., Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969).
R'See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 319 U.S. 184,
192 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
13See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
"See notes 9-10 & accompanying text supra.
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ordinance permits mobile homes in one or more residential districts but
confines them to approved parks, the mobile home dweller may still be
disadvantaged. Land costs applied to the mobile home dweller in the
form of rents may be higher because of zoning regulations limiting the
development of mobile home park sites.2 Consequently, the would-be
mobile home dweller must either pay high rent in a mobile home park
or pay a high price for a conventional dwelling in a residential area.
Nevertheless, classifications based on wealth are not sufficient to
invoke the constitutional test of rigid scrutiny unless a fundamental
right is involved. In Dandridge v. Williams,3 for example, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of a state's limitation of welfare benefits to
the poor even though the Court conceded that "[t]he administration of
public welfare assistance . . . involves the most basic economic needs
of impoverished human beings."94 The Court declined to apply the con-
stitutional test of rigid scrutiny: "The Fourteenth Amendment gives the
federal courts no power to impose upon the states their view of what
constitutes wise economic or social policy." 5 The mobile home, like
public assistance, may also provide a basic need for those who can
afford few other means of shelter, but a federal or state court is not
likely to find a fundamental right to reside in a particular area regard-
less of the ability to pay for permissible dwellings. Federal courts have
either reaffirmed the holding of Euclid" or have avoided the constitu-
tional issue,97 and state courts have consistently proceeded along classic
due process and equal protection standards. 8
CONCLUSION
Municipal ordinances regulating the location of mobile homes may
often be the result of stereotyped prejudices against mobile homes and
mobile home dwellers; they may represent an attempt to prescribe aes-
thetics; they may even be motivated by a desire to protect local con-
struction companies and other local industries related to the construc-
tion, maintenance, or furnishing of conventional dwellings. The ordi-
12See D. HAGMIAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL § 79 (1971).
-397 U.S. 471 (1970).
'11d. at 485.
91d. at 486.
"See, e.g., Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
"TSee, e.g., People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 375 U.S. 42 (1963).
sSee, e.g., City of Gastonia v. Parrish, 271 N.C. 527, 157 S.E.2d 154 (1967).
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nances may be simply a result of the reluctance to accept something that
has the potential of changing the way of life in even the smallest of
communities." The mobility of mobile homes does create problems not
encountered in the regulation of conventional housing, and reasonable,
comprehensive regulation of mobile homes is necessary. But, all
municipal ordinances regulating the location of mobile homes should be
rooted in the underlying premise that the structures are basically single-
family residences. The concept of mobile housing, whether termed mo-
bile homes, prefabricated housing, or modular housing, is here to stay.
CHRISTIAN NESS
APPENDIX
Suggested Ordinance for the Erection of Single Mobile Homes
(1) Installation Requirements. Before a mobile home is erected and
maintained as a single-family dwelling house outside a mobile home
park, the following requirements must be met:
(a) The tract upon which the mobile home is installed shall conform
to the minimum lot size requirement of the district or zone in which
the mobile home is to be located, or, if there is no such requirement,
then the tract shall consist of at least - square feet if public water
and sewage services are not available, or - square feet if such
services are available;
(b) The mobile home must be installed so as to conform with all
front-yard, side-yard, and rear-yard set-back lines applicable to immo-
bile housing in that district or zone. Otherwise, the mobile home shall
be installed at least-feet from all property lines;
(c) The mobile home must be installed upon and securely fastened
to a frost-free foundation or footer, and in no event shall it be erected
on jacks, loose blocks, or other temporary materials;
(d) An enclosure of compatible design and material must be erected
around the entire base of the mobile home. Such enclosure must pro-
vide sufficient ventilation to inhibit decay and deterioration of the
structure;
(e) The mobile home must be connected to public water and sewer
systems, if available. If not, the owner must provide a potable water
supply from his own or an adjacent well and must provide a septic
19See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 153-85 (1966). The author notes that many
zoning ordinances are not the product of a sincere and disinterested concern for the health, morals,
and welfare of the community but are influenced by political pressures.
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